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This i é Ri A a Mr. ae agenda Tauile of Instituto de Economia 
ederal do Rio de Janeiro, is the second i i 
on the employment effect of micro-electronics in the automobi e 
manufacturing industry. Hd 
Based on a review of literature on the Brazilian automobile i 
and field work, this report assesses the extent of diffusion .” Ml 
micro-electronic technology and evaluates its impact upon industri 
orantsacian and upon employment in this industry. Although dl Í 
micro-electronic equipuene is still in its initial stage not onl A pi 
a industry but also in the Brazilian industries in e Ss 
Brazilian automobile industry appears to be entering a new phase e de 
po a which is characterised by the introduction of «E equipment 
sa a of di new technology seems to be associated with the rola of 
e, cars" and tends to raise the technological standard of the local 
pc da pal level. This is closely related to the mn E 
dE ad E Antas importance as the home market shrinks due to e 
0 pa razil, Eme dt labour costs, however, tend to discourage 
Era ero-electronic equipment. 
e o MEM the limited application of the new technology, its 
pics colo iR ' any, appears marginal in the face of the enormous 
orig pes EEN that the economic crisis of the country 
TT A pe Nonetheless, workers have begun to voice their 
a E nerative employment effect of micro-electronics. The 
such technology for E E a reasing the internati 
A of local industry and maintaining or et th 
E growth on the one hand, and, on the oth - 
restriction regarding the micro-electronic or o co tpose of 
fostering in y equi 
E digenous capacity to develop and produce such q Ppment.
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EMPLOYMENT EFFECT OF MICRO-ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 
IN THE BRAZILIAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
The main objective of this study is to assess impacts of 
micro-electronic (ME) "new technologies" - numerically controlled machine 
tools (NCMTs), robots, and programmeble controllers - on employment, work and 
industrial organisation in the Brazilian automobile industry, including both 
the final assembly of cars and trucks and the auto-parts manufacturing. 
Section 1 contains a brief historical review of the development of this 
industry, providing basic ground for our analysis. 1t will be artgued that the 
use of micro-electronic equipment in this industry is just begianiag, and char 
there is some indication of an increasing degree of integration of the 
industry in a global process of competition and accumulation. Likewise, there 
arise new possibilities of involvement of the local labour force into the 
international division of labour. Section 2 is concerned with the extent and 
pattern of diffusion of micro-electronic equipment in the assembly sector of 






be pointed out that local economic conditions and muitinatonal automobile 
companies' strategies have been influencing the diffusion of new technologies 
in this industry. Section 3 deals with the auto-parts manufacturing sector 
vhere the new technology spreads, partly, as a response to assemblers 
policies. Section 4 will examine the impact of micro-electronic equipment on 
employment, work organisation and industrial relations. 
Our analysis in Sections 2, 3 and 4 is based on (a) information 
obtained from official institutions; (b) visits to four major car assemblers 
(GM, Ford, Volkswagen and Fiat), three truck producers, and one jeep producer 
who accounted for over 98 per cent of total autcmobile production in Brazil ia 
1984; (c) visits to 13 auto-parts producers including eight users of NCMTs; 
and (d) replies to questionnaires sent to the auto-parts producers wo wa 
had identified as NCMT users. Fifty questionnaire forms were sent out, but 
only 14 were returned including 7 of the 13 firms in (c). He also intervisued 
members of the boards of directors of menufacturers' associations like ANTAVZA 
(National Association of Motor Vehicles Manufacturers), SINDIPECAS (National 
Association of Auto-parts Manufacturers) and £BIMAQ (Brazilian Association of 
Machine Industries), as well as representatives of related government agencies 
like SEL (Special Secretariat of Informatics) and MIC (Ministry of Industry 
through DIEZESE (Deparer Timento 
and Trade). Contacts were also made with workers 
Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Sócio-Económicos (Inter-union 3 E a . . o : Pre rear o Statisics and Socio-Economic Studies).
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Our study was considerably constrained by the paucity of statistical 
data. There is no adequate data published by the Government or workers' 
unions, noz can it be made available by firms in a Systematic form. At the 
one of its most 
fects being high levels of unemployment and underemployment . 
The relationship between automation and 
time ot writing, the Brazilian economy is in a serious erisis, 
severe social ef 
unemployment is an extremely delicate issue, and firms are wary of discussing it. The major metalworkers' union in 
the industry ( in Sao Bernardo do Campo, Sao Paulo) has been under federal 
intervention since the first half of 1983, which makes it eyen more difficult 
to gain access to and gather relevant data, 
In addition, the fact that the diffusion of ME equipment is still in its initial stage makes it virtually impossible to Carry out a systematic and exhaustive assessment of current trends, given the material constraints of our project. Some steps have nevertheless been taken by the $ 
pecial Secretariat 
for Informatics (SEI), which is linked to the National Security Council, 
abridge somewhat the enormous gap of information about indust 




ion on Manufacturing Automation (CEAM) was formed 
first hal£ of 1983 to evaluate the manufacturing automation process and assist SEI in policy maxing. It yas composed of representativas of the society at large who were concerned with the matter. Three different subconmittees were put in charge of technological issues, industrial and market aspects, and socio-economic impacts, The final reports on Che work of the subcommittees were presented at the F irst National Co Automation (CONAI), held in Sao Paulo in July 1983, 
contained in those reports, 
ngree on Industrial 
Some of the information vhich may be Tégarded as the most up= to-date published data trom official Sources so far, Was useful for our study, 
Es General Background of the Brazilian Automobile Indust ry Before 1950, automobile producers in Brazil restricted themselves to The auto-parts sector, 
except when the 
» £:8» during the Second World War, 
parts 




in turn, seldom S18n of vitality, 
the beginning of that decade W8asures vere taken by the Brazilian Cove establishing industrial facil 
locally. In 13852, 
onwards, however, a series of policy Fament showing a clear intention of ities to manu 
the Federa] Government Development Commission (CDI), 
facture Automotive vehic les 
created, through itg Industrial the "Subcommittes on Jeeps, Tractors, Trucks and 
Cars". One of the latter's very £ 
! 





(Aviso de CEXIM no. 288) forbidding the import of any auto-parts produced in 
the country. In 1953, a new "Aviso de CEXIM" prohibited the import of fully 
assembled motor vehicles. Other measures were added to these acts, such as 
tariff exemption for the import of machine tools, which induced entrepreneurs 
to invest in the auto-parts sector. A Survey conducted by the National 
Syndicate of the Industry of Automotive Vehicles Components discovered that 
out of the 678 firms surveyed in the sector, 159 had established themselves 
between 1951 and 1955 [(17), p. 28]. 
During the same period, i.e. in the first half of the 19508, 
Willys-Overland came to Brazil to produce jeeps. So did Volkswagen, who 
wanted to produce cars and vang. But it was only in the second half of the 
decade, after the creation of the Executive Group of the Automobile Industry 
(GEIA) in 1956, that the industry really began to develop. In that year, GEIA 
approved 17 projects, out of which 12 were implemented. 
American firms' entry into the Brazilian market was rather slow at the 
beginning. CM and Ford produced only trucks, while Chrysler entered 
indirectly through their minority shareholding in the French Simca 
(Willys—-Overland also had a minor participation in Willys do Brasil). It vas 
European firms such as Volkswagen and Daimler-Benz that took the lead in the 
production of cars and trucka, respectively. Auto Union was only a Vemag 
licenser. 
After 1955, the Government permitted import of used machines to promote 
industrialisation - "Instrugao 113" by SUMOC (Money and Credit 
Superintendency). This was very important for the establishment of the 
Brazilian automobile industry, which began to produce obsolete models that 
were often out of production elsewhere, using outdated production methods. 
Governmental support to promote the automobile industry was not restricted to 
provision of such direct incentives. During the Kubistchek years (1955-1961), 
for example, there was a marked expansion of road construction and paving. 
The Brazilian highway network extended by 40,000 km in that period. 
According to Guimaraes [(8)], 1955 was the dawn of the first complete 
growth cycle of the Brazilian automobile industry, which can be divided into 
two phases; a phase of very accelerated growth up to 1962, 
growth between that year and 1967, 
From 1957 to 1962, production increased more th 
30,541 to 191,1949 units ((18)), 
and that of slower 
an six times, £rom 
to satisfy the demand that had been suppressed since the start of the import restrict ion at the beginning of the 19508. This period is also characterised by the appearance of a large number of auto-parts manufacturera, Á significant portion of the firms were
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toreign-owned. "In some cases the decision of foreign=owned auto-parts 
producers to invest vas spontaneous, stimulated by an expanding market for 
their products. la other instances, however, the investment was a result of 
direct pressures exerted by assembler firme which, compelled to meet certain 
indices ot nationalisation, attempted to guarantee the supply of parts and 
components" [(8), p. 121). By 30 June, 1962, the rate of local content had 
reached 86,4 to 94.3 per cent, depending on the type of vehicle produced. 
Consequently, the auto-partg sector grew at a considerable speed. After 1963, 
the industry continued to grow, but at a slower pace. The production of 
vehicles in Brazil fell to 183,707 unita in 1964, and vent up again until 
reaching 224,609 units in 1966. 
Duriag this first growth cycle, production was not very diveraified. 
By 1957, 
and 1967. 
51 different models had been introduced, out of which 21 in 1966 
In the next ten years, 139 new models came into the market. (The 
concept of model here refer to the whole array of list options deciving fr 
smaller number of basic cars [(8), pp. 158-159]). 
In 1968, the second phase of accelerated growth started. This 
continued until 1973, and slowed down again after 1974, Product 
diversification increased to meet the demand in the upper income market. The 
market for used cars also showed s30me growth. Ford and GM atarted to 
manufacture cars, and Chrysler began to invest in car production. Some 
assemblers could not keep up with the new competition and vere absorbed; 
Willys by Ford, Vemag by Vokswagen, Simca by Chrysler, 
Motores (FNM) by Alfa Romeo. This wave of takeovers eliminated the t 
national producers - Vemag and FNM. 
Production technology was still not up Co the international atandard, as part of the investnent during this period was still dey 
of used machinery £rom factories abroad. Between 1966 and 1974, however, annual output of vehicles per worker doubled (see Table 1). 
Productivity may be explained ".., by several factora - improved machinery, change in the relation between the number of production workers and indirect labour employed, etc. - but there seemed to be a lot of pressure on the workers to intensify their effort at work. 
a reduction of production was accompanied by a drive to increase profits, There vere lots Of pressures to increase 
the techniques of production” [(9), Pp. 89], 
at the same level in 1974 ag in 1966 
om a 
and Fábrica Nacional de 
wo major 
oted to the transfer 
the 
This increase in 
By the time of the interviews ... 
production per worker without changing 
The real wage in the industry vas 
» after having increased b 17 per ti 1992 ((11), p. 81). 
e   
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After 1974, despite the -slowdown of the growth rate of the industry 
and the opposition of already existing firms, Fiat and Volvo started their 
production in Brazil. Fiat received strong governmental support through a 
significant participation of the state of Minas Gerais in the investment, as 
its car factory was located in that state. Fiat also entered the truck market 
by acquiring Alfa Roneo and using its production facilities in the state of 
Rio de Janeiro. Volvo was specialised in the production of trucks and buses. 
Both companies used advanced technologies of that period, such as tranfer 
machines designed for the production of one basic model. The last bis 
takeover in the Brazilian automobile industry occurred in 1980, when Chrys ler 
was absorbed by Volkswagen. . 
Uncil 1980, the automobile production kept growing fairly steadily vith 
only one exception of 1977, although more slowly towards the end of the period 
(Table 1). However, the crisis of the Brazilian economy, which was triggered 
off, among other factors, by the second oil crisis ín late 1979-80, hit the 
industry very hard. The extremely high interest rate on consumers* loans 
discouraged the purchase of cars: "... the cheaper loan to buy a (brand new) 
car (in 24 months) costs (currently) 150% per annum, or - something to feature 
in a book of records - the equivalent of more than five cars at every two 
years of instalments" [(14)]. The Government'a restriction on oil consumption 
had a similar effect. The production level in 1983, although higher than 
those of 1931 and 1982, was still lover than the level reached between 1974 
and 1980. This has brought about very serious employment problems (Table 2). 
In the production of buses and trucks, there is still no sign of recovery at 
the time of writing. 
Export of automobiles has been stimulated by the ereation, in 1972, of 
BEFIEX (Banco do Brasil's Commission for the Concession of Fiscal Benefits and 
Special Export Progremmes), which aimed at promoting the growth of Brazilian 
exporta and reducing the foreign subsidiaries' excessive dependency on their 
principal companies regarding the export policy. "These BEFIEX prograrres 
allowed the firms who committed themselves to making a certain volume of 
exports to benefit from a series of concessions, such as exemption from import 
duties and from taxation on imports of industrialised products linked to 
export activities. These importa were not subject to the similarity clausa - concerning capital goods and raw materials - but were limited by a specific 
percentage of the value of exports” [(7)), Forty per cent (in terms of value) 
1981 vere related to the 
Ás showa in Table 1 
cent of the automobile production in 1981, 
of all export deals handled by BEFIEX up to 
automobile industry ((1)], > ÉXPOrtg rose to nearly 35 per 
In 1971 assemblers in Brazil
0643e 
Table 1 
Production, Employment, and Exports in the 





E icles - Exports Mo tar] | Mumber o£| worker xport ——_—_———a, employees|. da Annual | production Year! (1)% |(2)** [Total j Units| growth (| (2) 
1966| 225 | 51,410 | 4.4 (100)*x* 
1967| 225 | 49,135 4.6 (105) 
19631 280 | 55,193 5.1 (116) 
1969) * 354 | 63,513 5.6 (128) 
1970| 416 | 64,075 6.5 (149) 
1971] 516 | 70,272 7.3 (169) 
1972| 522 | 100 | 622 | 75,417 8.2 (189) 13 2.5 
1973| 620 | 130 | 750 | 88,625 | 8.5 (198) 24 81.1 3.9 
19741 754 | 151 | 905 | 104,155 | 8.7 (199) 64 | 163.9 8.5 
1975| 779 | 151 930 | 104,455 8,9 (204) 72 12.8 9.2 
1976| 334 | 152 986 | 106,568 9.3 (212) 30 10.2 9.6 
1977) 775 | 146 921 | 111,562 | 8.3 (189) 70 | -12.9 9.0 
1978l 925 | 139 |1,064 | 116,225 9.2 (210) 96 37.3 10.4 
1979| 967 | 160 [1,127 | 124,567 9.0 (207) 105 9.9 10.9 1980) 982 | 183 |1,165.| 130,414 8.9 (204) 157 48.7 16.0 
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exported to 16 countries (two of them accounted for 63 per cent of total 
exports), and in 1980 to 77 countries (three of them accounted for 5] per cent of 
total exports) [(2)]. 
However, Brazil's automobile export has been facing increasing 
obstacles, the major ones being the economic crisis of importing countries and 
the strong competition posed by Japanese cars, which account £or Ewo-thirda of 
the imports by Third World countries (even in Latin American countries such as 
Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, the Japanese share in car imports has been 
growing). Some Brazilian assemblers have been trying to cope with this by 
exporting CXD vehicles, in order not to lose economies of larger-scale 
production. 
Table 2 
Employment in the Brazilian Automobile Industry: 1974-1983 
(In thousands, as of 31 December of each year) 
 
 
Year Áuto-parts Final Assembly Total 
(A) (B) 
1974 200 104 304 
1975 230 105 335 
1976 226 112 338 
1977 235 113 348 
1978 270 119 389 
1979 , 273 128 401 
1980 279 133 612 
1981 198 104 302 
1982 219 107 326 
1983 ] 215 101 316 
* The figures in column B differ somewhat from the corres Table 1, for there it refers to the annual average. 
ponding figures in 
Concerning other recent international trends, two assemblers installed in Brazil have released so-calleg " la concept “which may not p y not be 
entative said 
world carg" 
very precise or too new; one assembler' s Tepres that th had t ey ha 
GM introduced Monza (Ascona) in 
Volkswagen is £xpected to follow suit with 
been producing world cars since the 19308). 
1982, and Ford Escort in 1983,
0543e 
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Santana and Fiat with Uno, both in 1984. A greater degree of exchange of 
parts and components may be expected among several production branches of the 
same corporations scattered throughout the world, but exactly how far this 
will go would seem to depend largely on the flexibility of BOLECtES of their 
host countries regarding import of parts and components. 
Such global strategy of multinationals has some adverse effects on the 
Brazilian automobile industry, since certain parts of the vehicles are now 
systematically imported. This naturally constrains the development of the 
local manufacturing capacity in the related lines of production. As a matter 
ot fact, the export-oriented government policy in the last ten years has 
allowed assemblers to reduce the local content of their cars to about 85 per 
cent. The programmes of "world cars'" are supposed to reduce the local content 
even further, down to 75 per cent and this has been, of Course, a great threat 
to the auto-parts sector [(5)] as will be discussed in the next section, 
On che whole, however, all assemblers enjoy substantially positive 
balances of trade; the value of their imports has been far lower than the 
value of their exports of parts and vehicles. This suggests that by and large 
the export-oriented policy tends to work in favour of the Brazilian economy 
and that there is some ground to support the introduction of new technologies 
including imported equipment, even though the overall policy remains to 
restrict imports with a view to reducing the foreign debt and protecting the 
local production of similar equipment. 
IL. Assemblers and New Technologies 
For the Brazilian automobile industry, the early 19803 seems to be a transition period in which competition has been intensified. A set of forces ls about to cause significant changes in the industry's organi sation and production methods, Such forces may be considered to originate broadly from three different but highly interrelated levels; 
a) The shrinking of the internal market after 1980 (Table 1 above) and the fXlremely serious crisis Chat has since been af fecting Brazilian economy as a «whole (in Particular, the ¿growing foreign debt). 
  
06438 
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organisation. Before we proceed, however, it must be noted that firms do not 
supply precise information about strategical automation plans even to the 
Government. At the time of CEAM's study, assemblers refused to disclose their 
plans on the ground that they were company secrets. Through our visits to the 
major assemblers, however, we have managed to get a general overview of mat 
they are currently doing or planning to do in the near future to introduce new 
technologies, as will be discussed below. 
The sharp decline in vehcile sales in 1981 left much of the existing 
(rather inflexible) capacity unused. la 1981, about 110,000 workers were laid 
otf by the industry as a whole and about 30,000 by the assemblers (cf. Table 2 
above). Since then competition has become fiercer, forcing the assemblers to 
reduce costs by means of more efficient organisation and more flexible 
prodution techniques, and to enhance the appeal to consumers by releasing 
higher quality basic car models, 
To a certain extent, the introduction of new technologies has been 
intended to increase production flexibility, and thus reduce inventories. The 
latter also required more efficient handling of materials and organisation of 
the production system. Virtually all assemblers now adopt some form of 
"just-in-time' system (naming it "Kamban", "minimum inventory system = sim", 
or otherwise) in order to increase productivity, although it is still confined 
within individual companies and there is not a single case of such 2 system 
involving subcontractors. Quality Control (00) circles have also been widely 
implemented... The extent and form of organisational change vary according 
to the degree of cooperation that the employer can secure from his employees, 
and are limited by the latter's mentality and abilities and by the technical 
standards adopted [(16) Pp» 104-111]. 
Substitution of new automation technologies for old equipment in the 
Brazilian automobile industry is still in its initial phase and has limits of 
its own. Although it tends to directly or indirectly increase productivity, 
it alsó implies heavy depreciation allowances and large capital investment 
which deter it. The cost of displacement of under-depreciated equipment is 
another problem. A plant manager in a large truck factory told us, "Il wish 1 
could substitute 20 NCMTs for 100 general-purpose machine tools in my tool 
room, but what am l to do with the replaced equipment? No one wants to buy it, even if l offered it ar bargain prices." 
The drive to attract consumers in the domestic market has stimulated the release of new and more sophisticated higher quality cars,? As 
Ewo ot the four major car assembler 
manufactured a "world car" 
indicated earlier, 
Ss ha lread ve a y 
and the other two will do the same in 1984. An
06438 
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important consequence of this move is that it has e. an RE EOpRiAsE 
opportunity for heavy investments in production facilities, e ens 
application of new technologies into production process and the implementation 
ot new managerial procedures. The implications for the diffusion of ME 
equipment are straightforward. Similarly designed cars must be manufactured 
with similar quality standards and techniques, even if produced in different 
countries. This is even more so when parts and components come from different 
places, 
The engine of the first world car released in Brazil is manufactured in 
a flexible transfer line, which is controlled by approximately 130 
prograrmable controllers (IPC-158C). The time tequired for Teprogramming and 
setting up the system anew is thereby drastically cut. At the time of 
writing, this type of flexible transfer line produces six different engine 
models. The system's capacity is about 2,000 engines per day, and 90 per cent 
ot the output is exported. At the same plant site, the firm in question has modernised the aluminium foundry by installing two casting robots, 
The producer of the second world car uses eight welding robots, which 
are now comonly used in Brazil, the first robot painting chamber and two 
cally controlled and flexible multispot welders which perform their 
functions extremely rapidly. Its weld 
electroni 
ing robots and robot Painting chamber Were the first of the kinds in the country, This company has also taken the opportunity to modernise its plant by massively introducing programmable 
testing and selecting parta, materials throughout the assembly line, 
Ás a matter of fact, 
controllers in lining up wheels, 
allocating 
etc. 
the aforementioned type of fle 
ormerly been introduced b 
when the Company released a new model 
yet). 
xible multispot 
y another assembler early in the decade, 
welders had £ 
(which was not called a " They are fed by electronically controlled magnetic troll the vorld car manufactured by this Company will be in the marke welding robots will be used initially in its production, The fourth assembler has no 
World car" as 
eys. In 1984, 
t and five 
plan of introducing ME equipment, except 
the testing equipment which the fir the production of diesel 
, m has been using for engines for export. 
Me have noted that assemb use ME devices - such as 
lers are increasingl y seekin 
Programmable controll 
This is the case, 
8 Opportunities to 
: €£rs- toa G d 
Production lines, 
utomate even their ol ] 
for instance, engines and assemb] 
the same model along the asa embly line, Yet 
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adequately used to meet the latest needs, as is the case with a firm which 
provides this coordination through the use of a conventional but very 
efficient telex network within the plant. 
It is clear that the pace of production technology innovation in the 
industry will be dictated by that of the introduction of new basic models. 
All the forthcoming models are associated with major automation plans. Only 
one firm had no major automation plan, but conceded that some automated 
equipment would be introduced such as air lift conveyors ("translift") and 
systems to hold the body of the car together during for welding ("maschercm"), 
both controlled by ME devices. Presently this firm uses only two NCMIs in car 
production (and two others in truck production), as loy volume production 
machines, All the assemblers believed that application of advanced technology 
was required right away so that the workforce could start getting used to the 
new technologies and receiving adequate training, and that they would not lag 
far behind the prevailing international patterns of production. The main 
objective is to pursue efficiency with flexibility and good quality control. 
All four major car producers also assemble trucks. They seem to be 
following a general: strategy similar to what we have already discussed with 
respect to car assembly, except that this is a far less dynamic market and 
that production lines often employ more conventional methods. 
There are three other truck and bus producers (who do not assemble 
cars) in Brazil. They are all subsidiaries of European corporations, The 
concept ot a world vehicle seems to prevail at two of them, The third one has 
been established in Brazil for about 25 years and its basic models have 
changed little over the period. They all have the problem of underutilisation 
of capacity, but the extent of application of ME equipment varies (Table 3), 
One firm has been using new technologies - mostly NCMTs - since 1975, and 
another firm has just begun to use NCMTs though not for the sake of 
flexibility, but as low volume machines. The last producer, recently 
established in a rather modern plant, uses no ME equipment. Among all three 
producers we have found the same tendencies toward reducing inventories, 
adopting more efficient organisation methods, producing a surplus in their 
trade balance, etc. As in car production, Chey introduce ME equipment to 
replace conentional machines when their serviceable lives come to an end. 
Surprising though it may seem, the only Japanese subsidiary in the 
automobile industry in Brazil is precisely the one that uses the most 
traditional production methods. It manmufactures less than 500 diesel jeeps 
Per month at full capacity (but is currently producing just over 50 per cent 
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However, there is a very efficient internal "Kamban system" and they say there 
is still much to be done for improving production orzanisation using the 
existing traditional equipment (each worker produces one vehicle per month, as 
compared with five vehicles in Japan). There is no plan of plane 
modernisation. As regards its integration into the world market, one of the 
company's staff members stated that "in order to gain the necessary 
competitiveness, all efforts have been directed to increasing the productivity 
of our parent company in Japan". The Brazilian plant therefore seems not to 
be intended for export. 
Among ME equipment, NCMTs are the ones for which local production 
capacity has been most highly developed. This capacity has been developing 
since the mid-1970s. By 1980, six firms were producing the equipment 
regularly, Two of them were owned by national private capital, and four by 
German capital. At the Mechanics Fair held in Sao Paulo in 1982, 16 firms 
displayed different types of NC equipment (again, the majority of those 
companies were owned by Germans). The skills for producing the 
electro-mechanical part of the equipment could be found locally, thanks to the 
existence of a traditional and well-developed machine tool industry in 
Brazil. Such skills have also been brought by newly arriving German firms. 
The capacity for designing and producing NC units has been the object of 
specific technology transfer policy formulated by the Special Secreteriat for 
Informatics (SEI). At the moment, there are four companies owned by private 
national capital engaged in the production of NC units in Brazil. They have 
bought NC designs from foreign firms and have spent four years to absorb their 
respective technologies. Since the volume of production is modest, however, 
the NCMIs produced in Brazil cost two to three times the price of their 
counterparts in the world market. Consequently the number of NCMTS installed 
in the industry is still modest. The car assembleres are using at least 21 
NCMTs (Table 3), but these are used mostly in tool rooms. They have been 
introduced where versatility and flexibility are required in the machining of 
small batehes of complex-shaped parts (mostly in tool rooms) independently of 
the release of new models. The flexible manufacturing system (FMS) has not 
been introduced in Brazil yet. 
None of the assemblers have introduced CAD yet, but most of them intend 
to introduce it in the near future mainly for two purposes; 2) to increase the 
designing capability and thus independence from principal firms; b) to get 
integrated into the latter firms' global System of production by increasing 
interchangeability of design and production plans,
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Table 4 
Mode and Purposes of ME Technology Application at Assembly Plants 
Reducing production of scrapped parts 
«Absorbing technology (learning) o 
: — «Increasing the pace of production (productivity) a 
«Independence from certain labour skills (ski 
«Labour savings . 
«Better working environment 10”
cluding safety 
.Increased coltrol of P 
tion £lows p. 
.Better quality and 
high 








The forms of new technologies with which we are now dealing - NCMTs, 
robots and PCs - may be used in different processes for different purposes. 
Table 4 shows the mode and purposes of the application of ME equipment by five 
assemblers (four car manufacturers and one truck producer) now using such 
equipment most intensively. This matrix must be regarded as a broad overview 
of the assemblers' purposes of applying ME equipment. (It was impossible to 
obtain from individual assemblers any reliable and systematic data on actual 
extent of application of such equipment.) The matrix suggests (at the points 
where at least two assemblers score an average rate of ú points or more) that 
the use of ME equipment by these assemblers in Brazil aims at: 
a) greater flexibility in production facilities; 
b) better quality (and more strict quality control); 
e) better control of production £lows; 
d) better working environment (including safety); 
e) speed-up of production (productivity). 
In only two activities (controls in general and continuous welding) 
skill saving has motivated assemblers somewhat strongly to use the 2ey 
technology. What is more, saving in labour costs is not an important reason 
for the introduction of the ME equipment. This seems to be verified in the 
light of the following exercise which is intended to give a broad idea about 
the pay-off period of a robot in painting and spot-welding in the Bra 
automobile industry [(3)]. 
zilian 
4 a ; 1 
The basic simple formula is P =——, where 
L-E 
2 pay-off period 
= cost of buying and installing a robot 




= maintenance costs. 
As regards painting, a "Nordson Robot System" has an estimated cost of 
us$110, 000, ? which, multiplied by 1.5 to account for installation and 
working costs, gives us the value of l. E was estimated at US$4, 500. As 
reported by user firms, one robot replaces two workers who earn two minimun z Rlinimu wages per month per shift. Data on wages supplied by four assemblers is 
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Table 5 
Hages in Auto Assembly in Brazil without Fringe Benefits, 
in US5/Hour* 
Estimated Minimum Maximum 
average average average 
Job wage reported reported 
Painting 0.98 0.69 1.23 
welding 1.08 0.90 1.23 
Tooling 1.68 1.40 1.90 
Mechanical Maintenance 1.36 1.27 1.40 
Electrical/electronical 1.75 1.26 2.69 maintenance 
* Calculated at the exchange rate of Cr$l.311,00/U5$1.00 as of March, 1984; 
the salaries indicated are those prevailing in March 1984, and not a yearly 
average. This remark is im portant in view of the distortions caused by high inflation in the country. . 
estimated at US$2,430 per worker per shift. The pay-off period would thus be: 
Pp. 110,000 x 1.5 = 32 years 
(4 x 2,430) - 4,500 
As for spot-welding, the robot was estimated to cost US$50,000 and 
double shift workers in velding earn 2.5 minimum wages/month, The pay-off 
period would be about 10 years, i.e.; 
Po 30,000 x 1,5 = 10 years 
(4 x 2,040) = 4,500 
The obvious conclusion stemming from the foregoing examples is that for sheer economic reasons concerning direct labour costs and fixed capital costs, robots of this type will not be used in Brazil in the near future, exercise must be viewed with caution 
underestimated by about 50 per cent 
Prevailing in the country. 
figures shown 
Yet, the 
» As the wage figures used might be 
howadays, due to the high inflation rates 
It is clear, however, that in face of the wage above, 
; : the pay-off period of this eq ln Brazil than in Eur ope, 
One might argue th 
vipment would be much longer the United States or Japan. 
at, in the future : ñ » “3ges might rise substantially in 1 ea Brazil and change the current conditions, but there is no such trend in sight for the time being. Many contraditor: 
Y Factors shoulg h e taken into 
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consideration in making a more substantive analysis. For example, the very 
savings in labour costs may not derive strictly from the direct use of the 
equipment, but rather from gains in the factory's overall productivity. 
Moreover, in general terms, there are important social, political, and 
cultural factors - and even some macro-economic implications - the evolution 
of which is difficult to predict. 
IITI:. ÁAuto-parts Manufacturers and ME 
L, The structure of the auto-parts manufacturing sector 
There are over 1,600 parts producers in Brazil, out of whom over 500 
are associated with SINDIPECAS. The latter are mostly large firas mich 
supply parts directly to assemblers. A vast majority of them is concentrated 
in the Great 
These 
Sao Paulo area, where most assemblers are also located. 
firms are certainly smaller than assemblers, but as a whole they 
employ about twice as many workers as assemblers do (see Table 2 above), In 
terms of sales, their market consists of different segments as shown in Table 
65. The intensity and form of competition vary considerably from one segment 
of the market to another, Many firms produce not enly auto-parts but also 
other products. Firms often supply to more than one assembler. Toa certain 
extent, this discourages assemblers to grant direct financial and technical 
support because they are afraid that their competitors might indirectly reap 
benefits from such support. This is also part of the explanation for 
non-existence of "just in time" (Kamban) system involving subcontractors. 
Recently, auto-parts manufacturers have been concerned about an increasing 
degree of vertical integration by assemblers, as a result of the " 
programmes. 
vorld car" 
The asemblers' share in the total shipments by the local 
auto-parts manufacturers declined from 70.7 per cent in 1973 to 59,09 per cent. 
in 1982, In the meantime, the decline in automobile production in 1931 caused 
dismissal of about 81,000 workers in the auto-parts sector against 29,000 at 
the assemblers' plants (i.e. nearly three times more). 
The crisis has affected different segments of the sector in diffíerent 
and often contradictory ways. lt sometimes acts as a deterrent, 
it provides - directly or indirectly - the stimulus t 
technologies, 
but at times 
Oo investment in neu 
To begin with, the reduction in the assemb 
much unused capacity, 
lers' orders nes left some of which had not even been pald off, a fact that is detrimental to new investments, has been restricted and interest This gives rise to two major consequences. 
Credit 
rates raised. 
Ñ Larger firms are more 
likely to overcome financial constr Sints than smaller ones, and foreizn
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Table 6 
Auto-parts Sales by Type of Market 
 Type of Market 
Average: Dec.81/Nov.82 







 Source; SINDIPECAS em Notícias, Feb. 1983, AAA Em Notícias 
subsidiaries are more likely to obtain financial Support either from their 
principal forms or from the international banking system. The smaller local 
firms are severely affected by the shortage of working capital and high 
interest rates. We have detected a serious concern that the sector may thus 
become more denationalised through the acquisition of local firms by already 
established foreign subsidiaries. 
Another factor acting as a handicap to smaller local firms is the 
difficulty in complying with one of the basic BEFIEX requirements for export 
incentives. Because of their weak international links, these companies (in 
contrast with foreign subsidiaries) cannot guarantee a minimum level of 
exports for long periods of time: "In the first place, the auto-parts exports 
Strategy has been characterised by the exploration of niches in the Latin 
American market. The commitment concerning pre-established export levels for 
long periods, as required by BEFIEX, was improper for firms which utilised the external market as an alternative, given the high instability of that market. Engagement in these programmes seemed restricted to foreign firms, who could £nsure quotas in their countries of origin, depending on the strategies of expansion of those firms at the world level, or confined itself to large Rational companies already articulated with t 
qe y 
he external market, participation in BEFIEX' Ss 
Second, ! 
ouraged by the high level of investm 
he early seventieg" [(7)]. The 
FR equipment and thus accelerate 
This also tenda to increase imbalances within 
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the sector. Some local firms have been trying to overcome their handicap 
through the establishment of joint ventures. 
Exports of auto-parts increased from US$165 million in 1974 to US$826 
million in 1981, and decreased by 10 per cent in 1982 (Table 7). Although 
they represent only 4 per cent of the sector's sales in 1982 (Table 6 above), 
they are certainly a promising option for larger firms and foreign 
subsidiaries to maintain higher rates of capacity utilisation. 
Table 7 
Auto-parts Sales and Exports 
(in US$ millions) 
Year Sales* Exports** 
1974 2,504 £0,4 
1975 2,707 43,2 
1976 3,186 55,9 
1977 3,319 82,5 
1978 4,467 12h, 7 
1979 4,967 165,6 
1980 5,464 111,1 
1981 5,116 206,0 
Sources: * SINDIPECAS 
: kk CACEX 
2, Diffusion of ME equipment 
The drive toward exports as a way out of the crisis is surely a factor 
that accelerates the introduction of ME equipment, since quality stendards, 
production flexibility, and efficient organisation are decisive requirements 
to enable them to face international competition. In 1971 auto-parts 
producers in Brazil exported to 33 countries (82 per cent of the total emount 
to 4 countries). As of 1980 auto-parts wer e exported to 114 countries (and only two producers accounted for more than 10 per cent of 
(06)] . 
The growing importance of foreign markets and the release of " 
the total exporis 
world 
cars" stimulate the sector's modernisation not only in production, but also in
06438 
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design capacity. CAD has already been introduced by a few firma and others 
are seriously considering its introduction in the near future, although the 
engineering designs of "world car” parts are not prepared by local 
but received from assemblera, 
The assemblers' 
Parts-producers, 
policy of reducing inventoriea has also been 
encouraging introduction of new technologies into the auto-parts sector. While the market for automobiles continued growing, orders were given to Parts-mamufacturers six months in advance and confirmed 
delivery. Nowadays, however, 
confirmed with a week' 
one month prior to 
orders are very erratic, They are generally 
8 notice, but one-day notices are not altogether * uncormon (suppliers complained bitterly about this). A few of the larger £irms and foreign “subsidiaries, along with some of the assemblera, have been studying the possibility of establishing direct inter-computer plac ement of orders so as to increase the efficiency of production integration ( though no actual move in this direction has been made as yet). 
The need: to assure uniformity of quality and respond quickly to modifications to orders (both regarding quantity and specifications) is definitely a powerful factor inducing auto-party makers t o adopt more flexible and efficient production methods, i. €., ME equipment. A member of the Board of Directors of Abimaq (the Brazilian Association of M achine Industries) mentioned that most inquiries about thia type of a quipment received by Abimaq members come from the auto-parts sector, 
Parts-makers almost exclusively workin € for truck assemblera have an additional reason for using NCMTs, viz. the low volume oÉ production. Moreover, their producta are often sub ject to modular variations in the same basic truck wuodels, thus facilitating dutomation. Two axle Producers who use large numbers of NCMTs do not employ them in toolin S,» but rather use them as Production machines in ingeniously integrated flexi 
ln the light of information originating from various Bourcea, at least 
which i£ added to NCMPs used by car “about 20 per cent of the total stock of NCMT8 of our Survey, 
but a larger number of such machines are than ín the assembly sector, 
50 Parts-makers were using over 150 NCMT3, 
and truck assemblers account for 
in Brazil (some 900) at the time They are used mostly in toól ro0us, 
used for low volume production Tuo-thirds of them had some foreign capital Y cent could be considered foreign-owned (í.e., 2 
The 14 respondents to 
ACMTS, out of which $2 per cent were lathes and 






Qur findings sunmarised in this table are cousistent with the general 
pattern ot ditrusion of NC4Ts in Brazil. Ina questionnaire survey in MD 
73 per cent of the NCMTsS were used by firms with 500 or more IU A 
per cent ot the sample firms in this size group used NCMTs. Eight out of th 
10 largest firms (in terms of gross operational revenues) were NCMT users 
[(6)]. Similarly, in the author's previous study, 66 per cent of all sti) 
(76 tirms) employed over 500 workers and 62 per cent were foreiga-owned (15). 
PP. 11-12], Not only can they better aftord to purchase such equipment than 
smaller firms, but they have also better knowledge about technological 
re. 
O o srmakera in our survey expressed an intention Of usina 
robots in the near future. Labour costs are too small a proportion of total 
production costs to justify labour substitution by rcbots where they might be 
technically suitable (as is clearly the case, for instance, in Loadine and 
unloading, tool changing, etc.). Direct labour costs ranged from 4 to 25 per 
cent of total costs in the firms visited in the sector. The drive towards ME 
Table 8 
NCMT Utilisation by Firm Size and by Type of Equipment 




: : Total 
Machining q AA Ti 
e, ot Smlayees) Lathes centres Others No. of units . 
“-. 7.0 Below 100 (m 1 4 5 
100-499 (4) 10 3 1 : 14 20.0 
500 or more (Ss) 3. 9 10 52 73.0 
TOTAL (14) : 44 rr o 15 mn 100.0 
z 62.0 17.0. * 21.0 100.0 
Note: The figures in the parenthesis indicate the numbers of sample firas in individual size groups.
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clients in e 2 Supply parts of difterent models to different ime and vith th z E markets). £ necessary quality (for both local and foreign 
3 25 per cent of their Production Was expo ¿ Ported, as compared with about 4 per cent in the sector as a 
“hole. Their Production for the re : Placement ma at the time of OUT Survey, rket stood at 35,5 per cent 
whe cent. F£as that tor assemblers had decreased to 38 per These findi E NES seem to su A gBest 1 e áre really Introducing n > Chat firms aiming at the foreign market eW technologies, replacement market may b (The increased a € interpreted to 3 Telated to the current e 
se ome extent, as a cyclical phemomenon 
Flgis,) 
Ás for assemblers, they have 
The need to increase 
Table 9 
Motivation of NT Application 
A 
Quality improvement 
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Major Obstacles to the Diffusion of New Technologies 
 
Obstacles Number of replies 
High price ot the equipment 14 
Brazilian economic crisis 12 
Low labour costs 7 
High social costs of automation 3 
Poor technical assistance 3 
1 Low quality of locally produced automated equipment 
Note: The number of sample firms = 14. 
competitiveness, the need to reduce unit costs, and the need to control the 
production process were also among the most frequent considerations, although 
they are obviously overalapping (Table 8). Contrary to the reasonably well 
established view, the acarcity of skilled labour was rather played down. 
Although the initial investment required for the introduction of ME 
equipment is large, unit costs decrease because better planning and control of 
the production processes reduce idle labour and the downtime of equipment. 
Moreover, a wider range of products can be produced, their quality is 
improved, a greater production flexibility is achieved, and delivery time is 
shortened, thus rendering the investment in NCMTs very efficient and . 
increasing the competitiveness of the firms. All.our respondents intended to 
buy additional NCMTs (50 per cent had a plan to do so next year), giving 
material indication of how satisfied they are. However, half of them had not 
made any a posteriori economic study to confirm the advantages of the new 
equipment. 
As pointed out earlier, assemblers have not interfered in the 
auto-parts producers' decision to automate their plants. In reply toa 
specific question whether they had received any financial or technical support 
from assemblers regarding NCMTs, all the firms gave a negative answer. The 
only exception was a company which acknowledged some aid received in the form 
of courses and technical information. 
Main obstacies to the diftusion of ME equipment in the near future 
seems to be the high cost ot ME equipment, the country's economic crisis, and 
low labour costs (see Table 10).
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IV, I mpact on Employment g£nd Labour 
Employoent impact 
No solid data base exists 
impact ot the diffusion of ME tec: 
However, 
L 
to permit a systematic evaluation of the 
hnologies upon employment in Brazil. 
ial Commission for Manufacturing Automation 
for Informatics (SEI) at least shows the 
ter. The reports [(4)] prepared by its 
ive estimates of the impact of new 
Zil by 1990 [(4), p. 15). One of then, 
Suggests that 800,000 to 2,400,000 jobs may 
2 industriea during the forthcoming period» 
Y questionable aseumption that the ME 
the creation of the Spec 
(CEAM) by the Special Secretariat 
Government 's concern about the mat Subcommittees Cootains two tentat technologies on employment in Bra Prepared by J.c, Peliano (231, be lost ia Brazilian Mmanufacturin, This estimate is based on the highl Automation Process of this country will follow the same pattern and pace 48 
the recent forecasts -by the Carneg industry. during the same 
(13), p. 
le Melon lastitute expect in the American Period. More realistic is the study by S. Rocha 5] “ich considers the three different possibilities regarding the 
tate of diffusion o£ ME, Assuming a total stock of equipment (NCMTs, robots. 
ene CAD systems) at 2,000, 10,000 or 40,000 units in 1990, Rocha estimates £he 
Corresponding FENge 0 variations in job positions in the order of sud 85, 000-352,000 positions, respectively. The only empirical data on labour displacement due to the use of NC 
equipment in Brazil that is quoted in that report vas drawa from a study 
Conducted by the Present au 
The data obtained for the 
diffusion of 200 NCMTA in Brazil by 1980 Suggests that there was, a net direct 
loss 0£ 2,000 to 4,800 jobs out of a total between 4,200 and 7,000 positions 
affected (between 48 Per cent and 69 Per cent). Those jobs, however, may have 
Other indirect (ang Unmeasurable) effects. These 
Proportiona are Stricter tha 




For exemple our i i d visits in 
this Andustry have Confirme 
, 20ños 0 Ma 
an Average, 3 to 5 Conventi. majority of si i 
j y NCATS in Brezil are still attended individua 
have replaced ROD-automatia machines 
at to various Companies each NCHT replaced, On ” and 8eneral-purpose ” machine toola, The 
1ly by a worker. They Thus, the use of about 190 NcuTs (150 
in Che Parts—manufacturing 40 in the Assembly sector) must 
Sector and   
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have replaced between 570 and 950 conventional wechine tools, and ÓN a . 
loss ot approximately 1,140 to 1,900 conventional machine operators Pera o 
case the proportion between activities directly related to the use of , 
maintained (in that study, the author found 2,200 new jobs created at the : op 
and in the oftice), only about 600 new job positions will have been direct y 
recovered within the industry, including about 380 NCMT Operators and about 
220 programuers and other ME staff, Of course, there are some 
counterbalancing factors which are very difficult to Sessure (such as the 
increase in the competitiveness of user firms and the erearion of a e 
positiona by the local producers of the equipment), and which should be tal n 
into account in a more precise assesament of the overall net effects on 
DN tar as one can tell fron Table 1, the productivity of labour E 
the assembly sector measured in termas of the number of vehicles produced per 
worker in 1983 was below the level achieved in 1975, although it vas higher , 
than in 1981 and 1982. The volume of employment in the industry including the 
parts-manufacturing sector kfluctuates with the level of om: 
ln the parts-manufac turing sector, it must have been affected also o 
declining local content ratio of the Brazilian automobiles, although no 
Quantitative assesgment haa been attempted qee. a aa 
Clearly, the current amount of technological unemployment in pe is, 
if any, marginal as compared with that of conjunctural and NON Lia 
unemployment. Under the circumstances, it is understandable that pre ca 
vorkera give a low priority to technological issues as discovered by a stu y 
conducted in early 1983. For this study, DIEESE distributed 19,500 , 
questionnaires arcong metalworkers at 21 firms in Santo André (part of the 
Great Sao Paulo area), They got replies from 12 per cent of the vorkers. de 
had access to the raw data relating to workera of five euro-parte firms. 
Control over mechanisation and robotisation ranked lowest among six choices 
Presented to workers as the slogan tor the 1983 wage compaign, astracting only 
3.8 per cent ot the replies, Theic main concerns vere: job stability G1.8 
per cent), union representation within plants (26.2 per cent), and vorkers 
commiesions which are intended, among other things, to improve working 
conditions at the workshop level (19,3 per cent). 
The fact ia that, so far, the Brazilian working class has not even had 
a chance to become thoroughly familiar with the dynamics of an 
industrialisation based on conventional electro-mechanical equipment and 
brought about by the The local working class SPpeara to be shocked by the new 




horizon opened up by the new technolo 
time in their history, 
vorkerg' 
Stability 
gica, and in early 1982, for the firat 
Brazilian unions did include technological issues - 
Protection from undegirable effects from technological progresa; job » guarantee of retraining, 
vith employers, who immediately dis 
alternative Proposals, 
etc. - in their agenda of negotiations 
missed the subject virhout offering any 
Me have had several contacts with uniong and representatives of factory 
comissiong, hen were very concerned and anxious about the 
n of ME equipment, but did not understand its 
to monitor its consequences. The only 
ion which vas planning to analyse the labour 
related to a model of vehicle which had gone out 
Y, and compare it with the one related to a new 
ame time. The asseubler had not only refused to 
Virtually al1 of t 
FS0sequences Of the introductio 
rationale and had done nothing exception was a factory commiss 
Content of the Prodution line 0£ production two years earlíe 
model released 2t about the y 
COOperate but Yegarded it as an attitude of antagonism on the part of the Workera. Nonethelesa, other factory commissions and uniones intend to make Similar attempts shortly, 
nm The intensity and rhythm of NT (new technology) adoption should be adequate to preserve Mmastery over the production processes that are 
gical memory, 
ts 
altered and Over technolo 
to minimise the foreseeable 
MéBative affecta on laboy and to reduce the impact arising £rom the increase in technical efg ency upon inter-industrial relations" [(4))]. ici 
age límit for entry into the labour 
at least for a 
3 (4d) improving the 
ated to unemployment   
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by new technologies. Specifically, workers' participation should e 
the control over the rhythm and intensity of the mork paces (c) she vork a 
environment; (c) job structure; (d) the access to information about equipaent, 
processes and data that interfere in workers' activities. o _ . 
CZAM' s report is a sort of declaration of intents which may or =ay not 
be realised, but it reveals hc much of a social infrastructure is missing to 
iffusi f ME technologies. avoid possible harmful consequences of the di on of ME techno  
work organisation 
— Dn closer are likely to produce orgenisational changes. Eight 
Out of 14 auto-parts producers who responded to our queseionastre had expanded 
or created new departments (e.g. programming, maintenance of ON 
components of their equipment, NC tooling, etc.) in their plants, en most 
£irws are equipped for their om programming and meitnenance. 
All the firus visited as well as those which replied to our . 
questionnaire, stated that NCMI operators and Programmers vere selected el 
among their own personnel. Over half of these fizas pay pes O NCMT 
operators than to operators of conventional equi pmente át UN cen. + . 
Workers become more formally trained, thus paving their way for making a 
career from the shop floor into the oftice. On the other hand, Envases 
automation increases the possibilities of moving planning and control away 
from the shop, perhaps eventually moving control to offices located at ven 
great distances, such as a different state or even a different country, which 
has profound implications for the international division of labour. 
Thanks to the systemic nature of their technical Enovledas, new 
production workers have been able to use it as a exit for planning the 
process formally. la Brazil, it is not uncommon to find programmers who were 
formerly NCHT operators, and a considerable number O progremmers ve mer were 
studying engineering (or they were already engineers). In the meantins, . 
computer programming is becoming part of routine mork e2 though only about 20 
per cent of.our respondents indicated they were doing it. 
In terms of the skill requirements and prerequisites for Operating 
NCMTs, preterences were divided between opposite extremes: some firms 
Preferred newly trained young workers who might quickly get used to 
technical culture, while others would rather choose workers with 
experience with conventional machines, 
the new 
á long 
to entrust with expensive and strategic 
equipment. There seems to be some sort of barrier in Te-trainings oider 
workers to operate new ME equipment. In Many cases, 
however, these workers' practical experiences remain valuable assets of the firms.
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Y. Surmary and Conclusions 
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9F introduction of ME equipment in o- parts manufeturing sector, the most are also beginning to be int 
ntr 
Pro 
. Stamable controllers and CAD system8 introduce robots in 
o duced. However, 
We discovered no plan to 




Partly because of the still very modest extent of application of ME 
equipment - fewer than 20 robots and about 190 NCXTs - in this industry, the 
amount of labour displacement caused by the new technology appears, if any, 
marginal compared with the enormous amount of structural and cyelical 
unemployment caused by the general depression of the economy. To illustrate 
this, it may be poiated out that the annual numbers of venicles produced per 
worker in 1980-83 were below the level of 1975. 
Workers' unions have just begun to voice their concern about 
(potential) employment effect of ME technolgies. The issue, however, still 
receives a very low priority in their agenda of negotiations with employers, 
in the face of the overwhelming impact of the current economic crisis, 
The Government is concerned with the socio-economic implications of the 
diffusion ot ME technologies in two ways. On the one hand, it is worried 
about possible negative employment and other effects and exploring means to 
overcome them. On the other, it is trying to promote local - and indigenous - 
capacity to design and produce ME equipment. 
In this effort, Brazil is in a serious dilerma. The drive towards 
automation and the utilisation of ME technologies have been hampered by the 
Goverment policy to protect the national capital goods industry and by the red 
tape. There have been general complaints about that. The complaints seem 
often valid as regards, tor example, the inability of the Government to 
distinguish what is important to protect (or forbid the import of) ¿rom what 
is not. Production facilities sometimes remain idle for long periods because 
ot che difficulties in replacing a one-dollar ME component. On the other 
hand, it no protection existed at all, the whole long-term strategy of 
building local capacity to design and produce ME equipment might come apart 
once and for all. Apart from such long-term macro-economic argument, there is 
2 more immediate micro-economic dilerma: ¡if there is a danger that excessive 
protection may hinder the adoption of the latest technologies, thereby 
reducing the competitiveness ot local firms, there also is the fact that, 
without protection, some ot the national firms are sure to be killed by 
international competition even before birth.
(Editor's note); On the concepts of the " 
system" and Quality Control (QC) circle", 
"Micro-electronics and employment in the J World Enployment Programme Re 
(Geneva, ILO, May 1984) 
It is i i s interesting to observe, however, 
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